Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 35

Issue 4

Article 8

1947

Contracts--The Anticipatory Breach Doctrine in Kentucky
Arnett Mann
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mann, Arnett (1947) "Contracts--The Anticipatory Breach Doctrine in Kentucky," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 35: Iss. 4, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol35/iss4/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

CONTRACTS-THE ANTICIPATORY BREACH DOCTRINE
IN KENTUCKY
A breach of contract is defined as "a non-performance of any
contractual duty of immediate performance."' This definition contains the premise that until the time has arrived for performance,
as called for in the contract, there can be no breach. An exception
is found in the doctrine of anticipatory breach. Justice Cardozo
gave a general definition of such a breach by saying: "Strictly an
anticipatory breach is one committed before the time has come
when there is a present duty of performance ....
It is the outcome
of words or acts evincing an intention to refuse performance in the
future."'
The term "repudiation" as used herein means a manifestation
of intent not to perform the contract. The general rule is that to
have the effect of a repudiation, the manifestation of intent not to
perform must be positive and unconditional2 Kentucky cases are
in accord with this principle.' A repudiation may consist of a
positive statement of refusal to perform; selling the subject matter
of the contract to another before the time for performance; a denial
of the validity of the contract; asserting a meaning to the contract
different from the true one, coupled with a manifestation of intent
to conform only, according to the erroneous interpretation 2 In line
with this, the following acts were held by the Kentucky court to constitute repudiations: denial of the contract and expressed intention
not to perform;' a statement of probable inability followed by
silence in regard to correspondence urging performance;' a statement
of intention to reduce the price agreed upon in the contract;' a statement of intention not to perform unless the other party assents to
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 312.
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 681, 56 S. Ct.
615, 618, 80 L. Ed. 971, 977 (1936).
'Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 853 (1899);
Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490, 6 S. Ct. 850, 29 L. Ed. 984 (1886);
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 59, 38 N.E. 773 (1894);
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) sec. 1324.
'Country Homes Magazine v. Hobbs' Adm'x., 243 Ky. 663, 49
S.W. 2d 542 (1932); Acme-Jones Co. v. Ellis Milling Co., 200 Ky.
811, 255 S.W. 829 (1923); Paducah Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas
Stave Co., 193 Ky. 774, 237 S.W. 412 (1922); see Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Md. v. Brown, 230 Ky. 534, 537, 20 S.W. 2d 284, 286 (1.929).
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) sec. 1325; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 318.
6 Country Homes Magazine v. Hobbs' Adm'x., 243 Ky. 663, 49
S.W. 2d 542 (1932).
7Louisville Packing Co. V. Crain, 141 Ky. 379, 132 S.W. 575
(1910).
'Ross v. Columbus Mining Co., 226 Ky. 166, 10 S.W. 2d 628
(1928).
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a provision not within the contract;' a notice that the remainder of
0
the goods contracted for will not be received; awarding the contract
for the same work to another.'
As to when a repudiation constitutes a breach there are two
views. The Restatement of Contracts takes the view that the repudiation itself is the breach," the effects of which may be nullified
by withdrawal of the repudiation before the innocent party has
brought an action or otherwise materially changed his position in
Technically, however, a breach of contract
reliance on the breach.
gives rise to a cause of action which, logically, cannot be disposed
Mr.
of by withdrawal of the breach by the party guilty of it.
Williston, however, states the general rule to be that a repudiation
is merely one element of a breach giving the innocent party an election. " He may complete the breach by bringing an action or otherwise materially changing his position in reliance on the repudiation,
or he may ignore it, thereby keeping the contract still in existence.
In Kentucky it has been held that a verbal acceptance of the reIn
pudiation, without more, is sufficient to complete the breach.'
this, the Kentucky court, standing practically alone, treats the repudiation as an offer. This is unrealistic, as it requires the assumption that the one repudiating is offering to subject himself to
legal liability. It is necessary to treat the repudiation as irrevocable
after the innocent party has brought an action or otherwise materially changed his position in reliance on it, but this result should not
follow a mere verbal acceptance of the repudiation.
The general rule is that if the innocent party does not elect to
treat the repudiation as a breach, the party who repudiated may reIn Kentucky if the
tract it and the contract remains unimpaired.
repudiation is not accepted it may be retracted at any time before
the actual breach." Though the promisee may ignore the repudiaSmith v. Phillips, 16 Ky. L. R. 615, 29 S.W. 358 (1895).
v. Globe Refining Co., 22 Ky. L. R. 911, 59 S.W. 12
(1900).
"Hollerbach & May Contract Co. v. Wilkins, 130 Ky. 51, 112
S.W. 1126 (1908).
"RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 318.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 319.
WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) secs. 1322, 1323.
'Morris

"Paducah Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas Stave Co., 193 Ky. 774,
237 S.W. 412 (1922); Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain, 141 Ky. 379,
132 S.W. 575 (1910).
'"WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) sec. 1335; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS

(1933) sec. 319.

Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas Stave Co., 193 Ky. 774,
237 S.W. 412 (1922) (by implication); see Louisville Packing Co.
v. Crain, 141 Ky. 379, 391, 132 S.W. 575, 579 (1910).
17Paducah
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tion, his own performance must cease after notice of the repudiation,
for he can do no act that will increase the amount of the damages"
No Kentucky cases were found on this rule.
In addition to the privilege of withdrawing the repudiation, another effect of failure to treat the repudiation as a breach is that the
right to so treat it may be lost completely. For example, the party
who repudiated may escape liability by the subsequent occurrence
of facts that invalidate the contract or render it impossible of performance, thereby discharging his duty. In Avery v. Bowden," a
leading case on this point, the promisee insisted after the repudiation that the other party perform. Before the time for performance,
war broke out between England and Russia. In a later action for
breach of contract it was held that the duty of the party who repudiated the contract had been discharged by impossibility. Kentucky has accepted this principle."
Following a repudiation, and before the time set for performance, the innocent party may pursue one of three courses. He may:
(1) treat the contract as though it were rescinded and recover in
quantum meruit for any performance he has rendered; (2) treat the
repudiation as an immediate breach and sue before the time set
for the other party's performance, for damages he has sustained or
may sustain, or; (3) treat the contract as still binding for the purpose
of suing on the contract on or after the date the performance of the
other party is to become due if the repudiation is not withdrawn
before that time." Regardless of which of these he chooses, his own
non-performance will be excused. It has been held in Kentucky
that after a repudiati6n by one of the parties the non-performance
of the other party is excused;-- that he may recover in quantum
meruit for any performance on his part prior to the repudiation,
' Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio (N.Y.) 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670 (1845);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 338, comment c. (cannot unreasonably enhance the damages)
"6 E. & B. 953, 26 L.J.Q.B. 3 (1856).
"' See Paducah Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas Stave Co., 193 Ky.
774, 778, 237 S.W. 412, 414 (1922); Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain,
141 Ky. 379, 390, 132 S.W. 575, 579 (1910).
'Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 21 S. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 753 (1899);
United Press Ass'n. v. National Newspaper Ass'n., 237 Fed. 547, 150
C.C.A. 429 (1916); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 59,
38 N.E. 773 (1894); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) secs.
1313, 1337; Limburg, Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts (1924)
10 CORN. L. Q. 135, 178.
"Blake v. Clarke, 217 Ky. 340, 289 S.W. 287 (1926); Hollerbach
& May Contract Co. v. Wilkins, 130 Ky. 51, 112 S.W. 1126 (1908);
Smith v. Phillips, 16 Ky. L. R. 615, 29 S.W. 358 (1895).
2 Country Homes Magazine v. Hobbs' Adm'x., 243 Ky. 663, 49
S.W. 2d 542 (1932).
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or, that he may sue on the contract on or after the date performance
was due.' It is not intimated in these cases that he must await that
time before suing, and in fact, the right to an immediate action is
recognized in other cases.'
Of these three courses open to the innocent party, the controversial one is that which permits an action before the time for
performance has arrived. This idea of immediate suit had its origin
in England in the case of Hochester v. De Ia Tour. In that case the
plaintiff contracted with the defendent to serve as his courier beginning June first. On May eleventh, defendant wrote to the plaintiff
declining his services. May twenty-second the plaintiff brought an
action for damages for breach of contract. The court held for the
plaintiff, basing its decision on two premises. First, where there is a
contract for performance on a future date, a "relation" exists between the parties in the meantime, accompanied by an implied promise that neither will do anything prejudicial to the other inconsistent
with the "relation." Secondly, the plaintiff will be made to remain
idle in the meantime, may lose other employment, and unless an immediate action is allowed, will be remediless. If the first premise
was correct as to the existence of the implied promise, the action was
not based on a duty created by the implied promise, for the plaintiff
sought damages for breach of a duty created by the express promise.
The implied promise was only to insure that the contract would be
carried out according to the express promise. An action on or after
June first would have satisfied both promises. But an action before
that time ignored the express promise which established the main
duty and the time for its existelice. In regard to the second promise,
the contract did not require the plaintiff to remain idle up to June
first, and by allowing suit only on or after that date he could have
received the value of his employment. Denying immediate suit
would not have, as the court seems to have presumed, denied the
plaintiff later remedy by action on or after June first. The court
committed an historical error by concluding that it was already
established that a renunciation before time. of performance was a
breach of contract, giving an immediate right of action.'
Regardless of whether the doctrine of anticipatory breach allowing an immediate right of action is a logical one, it has been accepted by the great weight of American authority," probably only
"Acme-Jones Co. v. Ellis Milling Co., 200 Ky. 811, 255 S.W.
829 (1923).
"Ross v. Columbus Mining Co., 226 Ky. 166, 10 S.W. 2d 628
(1928); see Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Brown, 230 Ky. 534, 537,
20 S.W. 2d 284, 286 (1929); Royster v. A. Waller & Co., 186 Ky.
476, 479, 217 S.W. 684, 685 (1920); Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain,
141 Ky. 379, 390, 132 S.W. 575, 579 (1910).
2 E. & B. 678 (K.B. 1852) 118 Eng. R. 922.
WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) sec. 1313.
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 27, sec. 1337.
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two states, Massachusetts' and Nebraska,' have definitely denied it.
However, the doctrine does not apply to a contract originally
unilateral, or that has become unilateral by complete performance
on one side2 Kentucky law is in accord with this limitation.'
It is the opinion of the writer that the doctrine of anticipatory
breach of contract allowing an immediate action should be rejected."
The promisee may be fully prbtected by excusing him from his own
performance and by allowing him an action on or after the date set
for the other party's performance, if before that time the repudiation is not retracted. This does not require an anticipatory breach,
for the excuse for the innocent party's non-performance may be
based on such a principle as prospective failure of consideration or
apparent inability. There are additional reasons for its rejection:
(1) The innocent party receives the benefit of a duty not provided
for by the contract, at the expense of the party who repudiated.
(2) There can be no breach of a duty before the time set for its
existence without resorting to fiction. (3) The doctrine may prevent
possible reconciliation of the parties between the time of the repudiation and the time set for performance. (4) Facts subsequent
to the repudiation and prior to the date for performance might have
occurred which would have destroyed the contract without fault of
either party. This is a risk which both parties assumed when they
made the contract. To allow an action before the duration of time
within which the risk operates may hold one party liable for the
value of his performance to the other, when the former might not
have obtained the performance of-the latter.
(5) Damages are
frequently difficult to assess and may thereby result in injustice to
one or the other of the parties.
The doctrine of anticipatory breach originated by an historical
error. Unless the doctrine can be justified, it will be maintained
only by reverence for the precedents which have perpetuated the
error.
'Tirrell v. Andergon, 244 Mass. 200, 138 N.E. 569 (1923);
Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874).
'2King v. Waterman, 55 Neb. 324, 75 N.W. 830 (1898); see,
Carstens v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 858, 57 N.W. 757, 758 (1894).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 56 S. Ct. 615,
80 L. Ed. 971 (1936); Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Irvin, 146 F. 2d 232
(1944); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 318.
" Howard v. Benefit Ass'n. of Ry. Employees, 239 Ky. 465, 39
S.W. 2d 657 (1931); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Brown, 230
Ky. 534, 20 S.W. 2d 284 (1929); Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10
S.W. 2d 636 (1928); Pittmann v. Pittmann, 110 Ky. 306, 61 S.W. 461
(1901).
But see, Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement
of Contractual Duties (1924) 22 Micr. L. REV. 329; Llewellyn, Election Theory of Relations Following Anticipatory Repudiation of
Contract (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 610 (1937). •
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The theory that the contract is broken at the time of the
repudiation or its acceptance, or upon acts in reliance on the repudiation, has led to some confusion in Kentucky cases in regard to the
time of measuring damages. There are cases that treat the time
when the repudiation became irrevocable as the time to measure
damages.'
Other cases correctly allow as damages the profit the
innocent party would have made had the contract been fully performed.z Damages are a substitute for performance and should be
determined as of the last day performance was possible according
to the contract. The Restatement of Contracts states the correct
principle as to damages: "The rules for determining the damages
recoverable for an anticipatory breach are the same as in the 'case
of a breach at the time fixed for performance. '
The following conclusions may be drawn as to Kentucky law
on anticipatory breach of contract: Kentucky law is in accord with
the weight of authority in holding that to constitute a repudiation
the manifestation of intent not to carry out a contract must be
positive and unconditional. The repudiation is termed a breach,
though not final in nature. Some cases erroneously treat the breach
as an offer which may be accepted verbally and is complete at the
time of acceptance. The three courses recognized by the weight of
authority as open to the innocent party following a repudiation, are
recognized here. Although some cases intimate that damages are
to be measured as of the date of the anticipatory breach, later cases
and sounder reasoning would seem to place Kentucky in accord with
those jurisdictions which hold that damages are to be measured as
of the date performance was to have been due.
ARNETT MANN

"Paducah Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas Stave Co., 193 Ky.
237 S.W. 412 (1922); Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain, 141 Ky.
132 S.W. 575 (1910).
1 Ross v. Columbus Mining Co., 226 Ky. 166, 10 S.W. 2d
(1928); Hollerbach & May Contract Co. v. Wilkins, 130 Ky. 51,
S.W. 1126 (1908).
"4RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 338.
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